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Summary: 
First, this article uses standard welfare economics to illustrate the market failure and policy 
coordination problems caused by transboundary pollution problems in general and global 
warming in particular. Secondly, a brief overview is given of the main results obtained by 
empirical modelling exercises that combine both cost and damage estimates for global 
warming. Thirdly, the theoretical conclusions are confronted with the reality of ongoing 
international climate negotiations and the 1997  Kyoto Protocol is evaluated from an 
economic point of view. Finally, some recommendations are made for the design of future 




2. AN INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT MODEL FOR TRANSBOUNDARY STOCK 
POLLUTANT PROBLEMS 
3. THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES 
3.1 Laissez-faire equilibrium 
3.2 Socially optimal level of environmental protection 
3.3 Under-provision of environmental protection in the laissez-faire equilibrium 
3.4 Cost efficiency and the role of equity considerations 
3.5 Participation constraints and free riding 
4. CONFRONTING THEORY AND REALITY FOR THE CASE OF GLOBAL WARMING 
4.1 Cost and benefit estimates of GHG emission control 
4.2 Main elements of the Kyoto Protocol 
4.3 Evaluation of the Kyoto Protocol 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK TO THE FUTURE 
   iii
 
Glossary of terms, abbreviations, symbols etc.: 
GHGs: abbreviation for Greenhouse Gases. Six main GHGs are covered by the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphurhexafluoride (SF6). 
IPCC: abbreviation for Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, http://www.ipcc.ch 
UNFCCC: abbreviation for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
that was signed in Rio de Janeiro during the Earth Summit in 1992, 
http://www.unfccc.int 
Business-as-usual (BAU) or baseline scenario: description of what were to happen in the 
absence of deliberate policies to combat the environmental problem at stake. 
Nash non-cooperative equilibrium: An allocation is called a Nash equilibrium if, assuming 
that all other countries stick to their respective Nash equilibrium strategies, no country 
can improve its position by playing another strategy than its very Nash equilibrium 
strategy. In the context of transboundary pollution problems this implies that countries 
neglect the negative environmental consequences of their consumption and production 
activities on other countries. The equilibrium concept is due to 1994  Nobel Prize 
winner John Nash. 
Pareto efficiency: a situation is Pareto efficient if it is impossible to improve the welfare of 
one agent without deteriorating the welfare of other agents. 
Cost efficiency: a burden sharing arrangement for the distribution of emission abatement 
efforts is cost efficient if it is impossible to decrease total costs by reallocating 
abatement efforts while maintaining the overall reduction target. 
Integrated assessment models: models that combine a description of the economy with a 
stylised representation of the physical environment in order to achieve an explicit 
feedback between the economic and environmental variables. 
Game theory: mathematical methodology in economic theory that analyses strategic 
interactions of agents starting from general behavioural assumptions. The aim of game 
theory is to make predictions on the possible outcomes of strategic interactions. 
Annex B  countries:  list of signatories of the 1997  Kyoto Protocol that have assumed 
quantified emission ceilings to be attained by the first commitment period 2008-2012. 
JI:  abbreviation for Joint Implementation which is an instrument of the Kyoto Protocol 
enabling the exchange of emission reduction targets between two Annex B countries 
on the basis of a verifiable project. 
CDM:  abbreviation for Clean Development Mechanism which is also a project based 
instrument of the Kyoto Protocol for bilateral exchange of emission reductions. But in 
contrast to JI, CDM can be used by Annex B countries to buy emission reduction from 
non-Annex B signatories of the Kyoto Protocol. 




N  Set of countries in the world (cardinality of set N is n) 
Ω  Time horizon (finite) 
i U   Life time utility of country i 
t
i Y   Production in country i in time period t 
t
i X   Consumption in country i in time period t 
t
i I   Investment in country i in time period t 
t
i K   Capital stock in country i in time period t 
t
i E   Emissions in country i in time period t 
t
i R   Emission reduction in country i in time period t 
t T ∆   Global mean temperature change in period t 
()
tt
ii FK  Production function for country i in period t 
t
i A   Shifting parameter capturing exogenous technological change in 
production technology for country i in period t 
()
t
ii CR  Emission abatement cost function for country i 
()
t





NN N hEE E …   Temperature change function mapping global emission history into 
global mean temperature change at time t 
δ   Rate of capital depreciation 
ρ   Rate of time preference 
t
i σ   Emission-output coefficient for country i in period t 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years the concern about the possibility of an enhanced greenhouse effect as a 
consequence of the emission of so-called greenhouse gases (GHGs) is rapidly growing. Under 
a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario without any specific policy to curb emissions of GHGs 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Third Assessment Report expects that global 
mean temperature will rise by 1.4 to 5.8°C between 1990 and 2100. This would cause the sea 
level to rise by approximately 0.09 to 0.88 meter over the same period. Precipitation patterns 
would change drastically resulting in major shifts of agricultural production zones. Also the 
variability and likelihood of extreme events like hurricanes is projected to increase due to 
global warming. If one wants to reduce the negative consequences of this enhanced 
greenhouse effect, emissions of GHGs must be curbed significantly.  
The greenhouse effect is a typical example of a global commons problem. Many fossil fuel 
users emit CO2 that dissipates into the atmosphere and is mixed uniformly. The ensuing 
greenhouse effect affects all individuals in all countries of the world. It is well known that in 
this case individual abatement efforts in a non-cooperative laissez-faire equilibrium will not 
be optimal from a society point of view. In order to reach a socially optimal solution, 
international coordination of the GHG abatement efforts of the individual countries is needed. 
Observation of reality immediately shows that the quest for cost efficiency (i.e. achieving an 
emission reduction target in the cheapest possible way) is not the only driving force in 
international negotiations on the coordination of greenhouse policies. Arguments related to 
the international income distribution are likely to play an important role. Leaders of 
developing countries emphasize that their economic situation justifies a lower abatement 
effort, the more so since the industrial world has been responsible for the large bulk of GHG 
emissions in the past. The problem is further complicated by the asymmetries related to costs 
and benefits of greenhouse policies. The negative effects of global warming are spread 
unevenly over the various parts of the globe and it is even possible that some regions might 
gain from a moderate temperature increase, at least in the beginning.  
More important for the present discussions on emission abatement burden sharing are the 
huge international differences in the cost of abating emissions. An efficient worldwide 
abatement effort requires differentiation of abatement levels between countries. Moreover, in 
most cases such cost-efficient allocation will require greater efforts from the poorer countries 
since they are often characterised by relatively low abatement costs. In that case there is a   2
direct conflict between equity and efficiency considerations. The relationship between 
efficiency and international distribution in the context of international environmental 
agreements will be an important focus of this paper.  
In section 2 we introduce a stylised model of the climate-economy interactions. This model is 
a simplified version of the seminal RICE (Regional Integrated Climate Economy) model by 
William D. Nordhaus. In section 3 we first describe a reference laissez-faire scenario in which 
countries do not care much about climate change. This laissez-faire scenario is confronted 
with a normative burden sharing allocation derived from maximizing a global social welfare 
function. We discuss the different interpretations that can be given to the maximization of 
social welfare-approach. In section 4 we confront the theoretical model with reality for the 
case of global warming. First some general conclusions are drawn from empirical applications 
of integrated assessment models to global warming. Next, the main elements of the 
1997 Kyoto Protocol are reviewed and are evaluated from an economic perspective. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. AN INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT MODEL FOR TRANSBOUNDARY 
STOCK POLLUTION PROBLEMS 
We will use a highly stylised model to describe the economy-environment interaction. The 
problem of global climate change will serve as an illustration but the model is general enough 
to accommodate for other transboundary pollution problems. We tried to strip the model from 
all unnecessary details while focussing only on the most pertinent aspects of transboundary 
stock pollution problems. Stock pollution problems are caused by the accumulated stock of 
the pollutant in the environment, not by its emission flow as such. The model is a variant of a 
standard economic model to describe long-term economic growth in function of population 
growth and technological progress. The standard model is modified to allow for a global 
negative externality (for instance climate change or destruction of the ozone layer) that is 
positively correlated with economic production activities. 
We denote by  { } 1, 2, , Nn = …  the set of all countries in the world. It is assumed that there is 
only one unique good that can be either consumed or used for investment in the productive 
capital stock. The unique consumption/investment good is produced using capital as main 
input A more general formulation would model explicitly other production inputs, in   3
particular labour. We will assume that other inputs are supplied at fixed amounts and can 
therefore be subsumed in the functional form of the production function. Let 
t
i Y  denote 
production in period t for country i. The production technology is described by an increasing 
and concave production function: 
(1)   () ()
tt t t t
ii i i i YF K A f K ==  
t
i F , the production function for country i at period t, consists of a common function f and a 
shifting parameter 
t
i A  that captures exogenous technological progress. This shifting parameter 
is assumed to increase over time though it might do so at different rates in different countries. 
More sophisticated models allow for endogenous instead of exogenous technological change. 
Capital accumulation is described by a standard dynamic relationship. Next period’s capital 
stock consists of the non-depreciated part of today’s capital stock plus current investment. 
Parameter 01 δ ≤≤  stands for the capital depreciation rate, we assume the initial capital stock 
1
i K  is given. 
(2)   [ ]
1 1
tt t
ii i KK I δ
+ =− + 




ii ii EY R σ =−  
where 
t
i σ  denotes the emission-output coefficient, i.e. the amount of pollutants emitted for 
every dollar of production. Emission-output coefficients can differ across countries and 
evolve over time. We will assume an exogenous decrease of this ratio corresponding to an 
autonomous improvement in energy efficiency. Emissions are in essence proportional to 
production but can be lowered by investing in specific emission reduction measures like 
replacing a coal fired power plant by renewable energy sources or investment in more fuel 
efficient cars. These emission abatement activities are captured by the policy variable 
tt t
ii i R Y σ ≤ . However, emission reduction is costly and this is captured in the model by an 
increasing and convex emission abatement cost function. The convexity assumption refers to 
the idea that it becomes ever more expensive to reduce emissions by an extra unit for high 
levels of abatement.   4
(4)   ()
t
ii CR 
Emissions of greenhouse gases accumulate in the atmosphere disturbing the global carbon 
cycle and causing ultimately climate change. We will capture the complex physical processes 
in the following general relationship: 
(5)   ()
12 1 ,, , ,  g i v e n
tt t
NN N Th E E E T ∆= ∆ …  
Temperature change at time t depends upon the global GHGs emission history from period 1 




∈ =∑ . We assume that the function 
t h  is continuously 
differentiable and increasing in each of its arguments. Behind this simple and general 
specification is hidden the complex physical reality of the global carbon cycle and 
temperature change processes. 
Temperature change gives rise to a variety of physical impacts like sea level rise, changes in 
precipitation patterns and extreme weather events and so on. The economic valuation of the 
damages caused by these impacts is summarized in a so-called climate change damage 
function: 
(6)   ()
t
i DT ∆  
The climate change damage function is assumed increasing and convex in temperature change 
reflecting the idea that additional damages will become more and more severe for high levels 
of temperature change, for instance due to non-linearities in the physics of the carbon cycle 
and temperature system. 
Finally, we can state the resource balance constraint in the economy of country i:  
(7)   () () ()
12 ,, ,
tt tt tt
ii N N N i i i i YD h E E E XIC R −≥ + + …  
The left hand side can be interpreted as “green” output, i.e. total output net of climate change 
damages. The right hand side stands for the different uses of this output, i.e. consumption, 
investment and investment in GHGs emission abatement. This resource balance constraint 
states that one cannot consume or invest more than overall green production in a particular 
country and period. This formulation implies that we do not consider trade flows between 
counties. This assumption is relaxed in many economic analyses but is not crucial for the 
results we will present in this article.   5
 
3.  THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
EXTERNALITIES 
We will compare in this section equilibria or solutions for the economic model introduced 
above. In particular, we will start in section  3.1 with a non-cooperative or laissez-faire 
equilibrium that describes what were to happen if all countries only follow their self-interest. 
This section is positive or descriptive in nature. Starting from a behavioural assumption, it 
describes how rational agents will behave. Section 3.2 on the other hand is of a normative or 
prescriptive nature. It starts by postulating a general societal objective function and seeks an 
allocation of emission abatement efforts that maximizes this objective function within the 
constraints of economic possibilities. 
3.1 Laissez faire equilibrium 
Economic analyses of an environmental problem usually start by describing what were to 
happen in the absence of deliberate policies to combat the environmental problem. This is 
called the baseline or business-as-usual scenario. In order to define such a baseline scenario, 
one needs to make a behavioural assumption in order to predict what choices individual 
countries will make when they are confronted with an environmental problem. Almost all 
economic approaches assume that economic agents (consumers, producers, governments, 
countries) pursue their private self-interest. There is some controversy however on how to 
define self-interest in this respect, especially when dealing with long-term environmental 
problems like climate change. 
For expository simplicity we will assume that individual countries maximize some  inter-
temporal utility function, in particular a simple discounted sum of future consumption levels: 



















+ ∑ …  
This specific choice of objective function entails several implicit assumptions that need some 
commenting. 
•  We consider a finite (but very long, say several centuries) time horizon: Ω<+ ∞ and 
linear inter-temporal utility function involving exponential discounting. This means that 
the value in terms of period  t consumption of an additional unit of consumption in   6
period t+1 is always  1 1 1 ρ ≤ + , independent of the consumption level. Countries are 
assumed to be “impatient”, they value current consumption more than future consumption. 
Moreover, their degree of impatience is independent here of their consumption level. 
Further, it should be noted that there is a lively debate among economists on the exact 
value of the rate of time preference to be used in the context of climate change and on the 
appropriateness of exponential discounting in general. 
•  The formulation in (8) assumes that there exists some hypothetical representative agent 
that lives for the entire planning period from t=1 up to t=Ω. In reality however, one 
should think of a sequence of several short-lived and possibly overlapping agents. 
•  The objective function (8) assumes away the internal political debate in every country. 
The choices made by a country depend on the outcome of a political process representing 
many different and diverse interests. It is well known in economic theory that aggregating 
those different preferences into one meta-preference might prove problematic. 
In spite of its simplicity and restrictive assumptions, we will continue to use objective 
function (8) since it is common in a large part of the economic literature on climate change 
and since it allows us to illustrate in the most easy way the fundamental issues involved. The 
interested reader is referred to the bibliography for more realistic formulations of the problem.  
In the absence of international cooperation on environmental policy, we assume that countries 
will simultaneously maximize the utility of their lifetime domestic consumption paths as 
given by  (8) subject to their economy’s resource balance condition  (7) and capital 
accumulation process (2). For simplicity we will assume that strategies are chosen once and 
for all at the beginning of the planning period and are not to be changed afterwards. 
In addition, temperature change and emissions are determined by the relationships in 
expressions  (5) and  (3) respectively. The control or policy variables in this dynamic 
optimisation problem are investment 
t
i I  and emission abatement effort 
t
i R . Given a time path 
for these policy variables, the values of the state variables capital stock 
t
i K  and temperature 
change 
t T ∆  follow directly.  
Solving this mathematical problem is beyond the scope of this article. We will limit ourselves 
to giving some flavour of the solution technique and to stating the basic insights. It should be 
noted here that one needs additional assumptions to resolve the interdependencies between the 
countries’ optimal choices. Since the emissions of one country influence the level of climate   7
change experienced by all other countries, every country needs to make an assumption on the 
emission behaviour of all other countries. This is usually done by invoking game theory and 
using some non-cooperative solution concept like the Nash equilibrium. An allocation is 
called a Nash equilibrium if, assuming that all other countries stick to their respective Nash 
equilibrium strategies, no country can improve its position by playing another strategy than its 
very Nash equilibrium strategy. Alternatively, in a Nash equilibrium every country chooses a 
strategy that maximises its individual pay off while assuming that the other countries continue 
to play their respective Nash equilibrium strategies. 
The mathematical solution of the individual country’s maximization problems gives rise to 
necessary conditions that characterize the optimal choice of the policy variables in terms of 
the underlying parameters of the model. Before reviewing the basics of these necessary 



















∂ + ∑  that stands for the 
individual shadow value to country i of all domestic future climate change damages due to 
emitting one additional unit at time t. This shadow value consists of the discounted sum of all 
the future environmental damages weighted by the effect of a change of period t emissions 






). The shadow value is a 
measure for the valuation a country attaches to the expected future climate change damages as 
a result of a marginal increase in period t emissions. Note that this shadow value decreases in 
ρ . The more impatient countries are, the lower the valuation they attach to future climate 
change damages.  
Laissez-faire optimal investment path 
Using this new notation, the necessary condition driving an individually utility maximizing 
inter-temporal allocation of investment (and hence capital) boils down to: 









∂  −− =∀ ∀  ∂
 
The left hand side of this expression stands for the net return on capital. This return consists 
of the marginal product of capital minus the depreciation rate. But the return on capital is 
affected negatively by future climate change damages through the shadow value 
t
i κ . The 
effect of future climate change damages is to depress the return on capital compared to a 
situation without climate change externality. Along an individually utility maximizing path,   8
the capital stock should be such that net return on capital, corrected for future climate change 
damages, equals the rate of time preference.  
Compared to a situation without climate change damages, condition  (9) implies lower 
production growth rates. Indeed, if climate change would not cause negative externalities, i.e. 
if  0,
t













. This means that capital should be allocated over time in such a 
way that at every period, the marginal product of capital (i.e. the product of the last unit of 
capital invested in that period) equals the depreciation plus time preference rate. However, if 
climate change matters ( 0
t















) implying a lower capital stock (because the productivity of each 
additional unit of capital is assumed to decline with higher levels of the capital stock, an 
assumption reflected by the concavity of the production function) and, as a consequence, 
growth rates.  
Laissez-faire optimal emission abatement path 
The necessary condition driving the optimal emission abatement effort can be stated as 
follows: 
(10)   () ,
tt
ii i CR it κ ′ =∀ ∀  
The left hand side stands for the marginal cost in order to reduce emissions by an additional 
ton. In a non-cooperative  or business-as-usual equilibrium, each country undertakes emission 
abatement up to the point where its own marginal cost of reducing emissions by one 
additional ton equals its own individual marginal benefit (i.e. the valuation of avoided climate 
change damages as reflected by the shadow value 
t
i κ ) of such an additional unit of abatement. 
For the non-cooperative or laissez-faire equilibrium, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
•  It is in every country’s self interest to undertake some emission abatement, even in the 
absence of international environmental agreements. 
•  The degree of domestic emission control in a non-cooperative equilibrium is a function of 
expected future marginal climate change damages within the country itself. Damages 
inflicted upon neighbouring states are not taken into account.   9
•  The more impatient countries are (reflected by their rate of time preference or planning 
horizon), the lower their valuation of future climate change damages and the less emission 
abatement action they will undertake. 
•  It is optimal to restrict emissions through two channels. First, a country should lower 
overall production compared to a scenario without climate change by slowing down the 
rate of capital accumulation in the economy. Secondly, it should invest in emission control 
measures up to the point where marginal abatement costs equal expected future marginal 
damage costs.  
 
3.2 Socially optimal level of environmental protection 
It is intuitively clear that the non-cooperative laissez-faire equilibrium will not be optimal 
from the point of view of global society. This can be seen from the expression for the shadow 
value of future climate change damages. Every country reduces its emissions somewhat but it 
only takes into account domestic negative emission externalities while ignoring spill over 
effects to neighbouring countries. This lack of internalisation of external costs in the laissez-
faire scenario is the main rationale for international coordination of environmental policies.  
Knowing that the laissez-faire situation is not optimal, the next question arising is: what is the 
socially optimal amount of emission abatement for an international environmental externality 
problem like climate change? In this section, we will explore normative benchmark solutions 
to the international externality problem. The basic questions are the following: 
1.  What is the socially optimal level of global warming, or stated differently, how much 
global emission abatement is desirable from a social point of view? This is the 
question of “how far should we go in avoiding climate change”? 
2.  Given an answer to the previous question, how should this emission reduction effort 
be allocated over the different countries in the world? This is the problem of burden 
sharing. 
Defining a socially optimal outcome is by definition a normative exercise that requires one to 
start with the specification of an objective to be pursued by society. Economists often use the 
concept of Pareto efficiency as a normative objective for society. A situation x is said to 
constitute a Pareto improvement over another situation y if everyone is at least as well off in 
situation x compared to situation y and at least one person is strictly better off. A situation is   10
said to be Pareto efficient if it is impossible to find further Pareto improvements, i.e. , if it is 
impossible to improve the well-being of one person without deteriorating the position of other 
persons. 
Pareto efficiency is an appealing normative concept for two reasons. First it entails the idea 
that resources should not be spilled, all available opportunities to promote the well-being of 
all should be exploited. Secondly, it refers to an idea of unanimity. If some one is worse off in 
the move from one situation to another, the Pareto criterion gives this person a strict veto 
power to stop the move. But on the other hand, Pareto efficiency suffers from an important 
drawback. Typically there are many Pareto efficient allocations and the concept is not able of 
ranking them. In particular, two Pareto efficient allocations can be completely different in 
terms of distribution of resources between the agents. 
Therefore, it seems worthwhile to take a more agnostic stance and work within a framework, 
which is sufficiently flexible to accommodate for different normative approaches on the 
societal objective to be pursued. One possibility is to look for the maximum of a general 
objective function, which is increasing in the individual (here: national) utility levels. This 
implies that we model the international bargaining process as a maximization exercise: 
(11)   () 12 ,,, max n UU U W …  
where the Ui stands for the individual countries’ utilities (given by the discounted sum of 
consumption levels for instance). Many interpretations can be given to this maximization 
exercise: 
1.  The first interpretation is the most traditional one, in which we see W as an ethically 
inspired social welfare function. Interpreted in this way, the predictive power of the 
maximization exercise may be minimal. Indeed, there is no international social planner 
that could implement the results. However, the exercise has an obvious normative 
appeal, because it yields the optimal solution for an ethical observer with a given set of 
value judgments. And we can do sensitivity analysis with respect to these value 
judgements, in particular the degree of world income inequality aversion.  
2.  An interesting special case is the choice of a linear specification, in which: 




=∑    11
It is well known in economic theory that under certain conditions, the full set of Pareto 
efficient points can be found as the solution to this maximization exercise by varying 
the λ -vector. This is interesting, since rational and well-informed negotiators will reach 
a point on the Pareto-frontier as the result of their negotiations. Of course, additional 
assumptions will be needed to choose between the different points on the frontier. But 
the maximization with different values for λ  gives us an insight into the characteristics 
of the bargaining space.  
3. Finally,  W can be seen as a shortcut to compute many traditional game-theoretic 
solutions to the bargaining process. All cooperative and non-cooperative solutions 
leading to a Pareto efficient result are special cases of expression (12) and will be 
recovered in our framework for a specific choice of the λ -vector. In general the 
specification of W may reflect the differential power positions of the different 
countries. This interpretation readily suggests itself for linear specification in  (12), 
which can be derived as the outcome of a bargaining game. The λ -vector then 
immediately gives the weights in a social power function. 
4.  The maximization approach also allows for inverse optimum calculations. For a given 
environmental problem and a proposed burden sharing, it is an interesting exercise to 
solve for the weights λ  that would make this agreement an optimal choice. This gives 
us an idea of the bargaining or ethical weights that were implicitly used during the 
negotiations. We will do an attempt in this direction for the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on 
the reduction of greenhouse gases emissions in section 4 of this article. 
Finally, it is important to recognize that the set of Pareto efficient or socially optimal points 
will be dependent on the instruments which are available during the negotiations. The 
description of the externality problem therefore has to be completed by a specification of the 
set of available instruments. Because we want to concentrate in this paper on the 
equity/efficiency trade-off in its pure form, we will neglect the problem of implementation 
and assume that the set of instruments to be considered during the negotiations consists of the 
vector of individual abatement levels { }
t
i R . Hence, negotiations bear on abatement efforts 
directly and not on policy instruments like, for instance emission taxes or tradable permits. 
Moreover, to illustrate the importance of monetary side payments, we will assume that these 
are not available.    12
3.3 Under-provision of environmental quality in the laissez faire scenario 
In the absence of side payments, the socially optimal allocation for the international 
environmental externality problem can be described as the allocation that maximizes the 
global society’s objective function (11) subject to the individual countries’ resource balance 
conditions (7) and capital accumulation processes (2). Like before temperature change and 
emissions are given by the relationships (5) and (3) respectively. Maximizing with respect to 
the capital stock gives rise to the following necessary condition: 





































∂ + ∑  stands like before for the weighted sum of all future 
marginal damages to country j from emitting one additional unit of emissions at time t. 
Maximizing with respect to the emission abatement effort gives rise to the condition: 




Cr it λλ κ
∈
′ =∀ ∀ ∑  
The interpretation of the latter expressions is more instructive for the specific case in which 
all countries are given the same social welfare weight  , ijij N λλ =∀ ∈ . Under this 
assumption the two necessary conditions become: 
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The latter condition is the well-known Samuelson condition for the optimal provision of the 
global public good “emission abatement”. It says two things. First, emissions are to be cut 
back to the point where marginal abatement costs equal the total sum of all marginal damages 
over all countries. Secondly, reduction efforts are to be allocated such that marginal 
abatement costs are equal across all countries (the right hand side of (16) is the same for all 
countries).   13
Comparing conditions (13) and (14) to the corresponding conditions (9) and (10) for the non-
cooperative equilibrium clearly shows the origin of the externality problem. In the socially 
optimal allocation, individual emission reduction is a function of the sum over all countries of 





∈ ∑ . In contrast, in the non-
cooperative equilibrium, only individual damage valuations 
t
i κ  are taken into account in 
every country’s decision rule. This observation leads us to say that the non-cooperative 
laissez-faire equilibrium is characterized by incomplete internalisation of external effects. 
3.4 Cost efficiency and the role of equity considerations 
When we attach equal weights to all countries, the socially optimal burden sharing should be 
cost-efficient: equation  (16) shows that the marginal cost of abatement (per ton of GHG 
emissions) is the same for all countries and equals the sum of the private valuation of future 
climate change damages. Cost efficiency implies that it is impossible to decrease the total cost 
of the global emission reduction target by altering the burden sharing. If countries differ in 
abatement costs, cost efficiency will require some differentiation of abatement targets. In 
particular, low cost countries should be asked to perform relatively more effort than high cost 
countries. In the case of global warming such cost-efficient allocation would require greater 
efforts from poorer countries (developing countries or economies in transition) since they are 
often characterised by relatively low abatement costs. In that case there is a direct conflict 
between equity and efficiency considerations. 
But attaching equal weight to each country is not so straightforward as it may seem at first 
sight. It implies that we attach the same value to an additional dollar of consumption to a rich 
and to a poor country. Many people object to this and argue that unequal weights, favouring 
poor countries, are to be used in social optimisation exercises. Using unequal weights, 
condition (14) shows that cost efficiency is no longer required. Countries with a high marginal 
social value of consumption  i λ  (for instance poor countries with a low initial capital stock or 
countries with a strong bargaining position) are required to abate less. The reason is 
intuitively obvious: because the international community has no financial redistribution 
instrument at its disposal, differences in abatement costs are used to influence the distribution 
of welfare. 
We now draw the following conclusions for the socially optimal solution:   14
•  Compared to the laissez faire non-cooperative equilibrium, individual emission 
restrictions in the socially optimal solution should be a function of the total (weighted) 
sum over all countries of all expected future climate change damages. This principle is 
called full internalisation of external damages. 
•  When equal welfare weights are used for all countries, the socially optimal burden sharing 
leads to equalization of marginal emission abatement costs. This principle is called cost 
efficiency and means that overall emission reduction cannot be achieved at a lower total 
cost by reshuffling the emission reduction burden. 
•  When one cares about equity, unequal weights favouring the poor should be used. The 
resulting socially optimal burden sharing will be more lenient regards poor countries or 
countries with high bargaining power and vice versa. Hence, equity or political power 
considerations can justify deviations from the cost efficiency prescription (if there are no 
compensating financial transfers available to achieve distributional objectives). 
 
3.5 Participation constraints and free riding 
Although by definition, total welfare in the socially optimal case will be higher than total 
welfare in the non-cooperative equilibrium (indeed, the socially optimal allocation maximises 
the societal objective function and it is therefore by definition higher than the value of this 
objective function evaluated at the laissez-faire equilibrium), it need not necessarily be the 
case that every individual country gains from moving from the non-cooperative to the socially 
optimal outcome. An example in the case of global warming is provided by the former Soviet 
Union. It is generally believed that GHG emission abatement costs are low in the former 
Soviet Union because of its obsolete industrial infrastructure. Replacing old coal fired power 
plants by new more efficient gas-fired power plants is a relatively cheap way to save 
emissions in those countries. On the other hand, the former Soviet Union is also believed to 
be only very little vulnerable to climate change damage. Hence, in a non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium, it would chose for a relatively low abatement effort. However, in a cost efficient 
global burden sharing arrangement, the former Soviet Union would be asked to perform a lot 
of cheap emission reduction. It should be clear that without monetary compensation, the 
former Soviet Union is bound to lose in a cost efficient international climate agreement since 
it has to perform a lot of abatement effort and the resulting costs are only partially 
compensated for by moderate savings on climate change damages.    15
Due to the lack of a world authority with sufficient coercive power, individual countries have 
strong veto power in international environmental agreements. It is clear that a rational self-
interested country will never join an agreement that would leave it worse-off compared to a 
feasible and credible outside option. Producing GHG emission abatement is essentially a 
public good provision problem. An important characteristic of public goods is that no one can 
be excluded from enjoying its benefits, regardless of the fact that he or she contributed or not 
to financing the public good. For every country, it is beneficial if other countries undertake 
more abatement effort since higher reduction efforts by one country imply lower climate 
change damages for everyone. This observation gives rise to so-called free riding behaviour: 
it is in every countries self interest to enjoy the benefits of reduced climate change without 
contributing to the required abatement effort. 
The public good nature of global environmental protection restricts the set of feasible 
solutions. A solution is only feasible if it is voluntarily acceptable for all its signatories. There 
is a huge body of literature devoted to this problem of voluntary international environmental 
agreements (see International cooperation to resolve international pollution problems) 
that we will not survey in this contribution. It is sufficient for our framework that there exists 
for every country some reservation utility level  i U  that it might obtain using a credibly free-
riding strategy. The precise content of these reservation utility levels will depend upon the 
game-theoretic equilibrium or stability concept one uses to describe voluntary international 
environmental agreements. We can now state the voluntary participation constraints of all 
countries as follows: 
(17)   ii UU i ≥∀  
In order to be implemented by means of a voluntary international environmental agreement, 
the burden sharing should result in a utility allocation that respects the participation 
constraints as expressed by  (17). The participation constraints should be included as 
additional constraints in the global maximization problem. Depending on what equilibrium 
concept is chosen to determine the relevant reservation utility levels  i U , (for instance, the 
noncooperative Nash equilibrium introduced higher can under some conditions be interpreted 
as a fall back position since every country can guarantee itself this outcome by refusing all 
cooperation) the global maximisation problem might become infeasible. In particular, if the 
joint sum of claims by all countries exceeds the maximal value of the societal objective 
function, there does not exist a voluntary international environmental agreement sustaining   16
full cooperation of all countries. Partial cooperation is then the only way out, see also 
International cooperation to resolve international pollution problems. 
The social optimisation problem including participation constraints leads to very similar 
necessary conditions as the conditions  (13) and  (14) before. One only has to replace the 
original weights  i λ  by new weights that take into account the shadow price of the 
participation constraints of the individual countries. Let us define  iii λλ ψ =+    as the new 
weights. If for a particular country, the participation constraint is non-binding, the shadow 
value  i ψ  of this constraint is zero and the new weight coincides with the old weight:  ii λλ =   . 
If however, the participation constraint binds for one or more countries, their bargaining 
weights increase. 
The effect of the participation constraints can be illustrated using the following picture. The 
vertical and horizontal axes give the utility level of the (presently) poor South and rich North 
respectively. The inner curve gives the production possibilities in the case where no 
greenhouse policies are implemented, the outer curve gives the production possibilities after 
the socially optimal level of emission abatement has been achieved. It is clear that the utility 
levels have to be interpreted in a dynamic sense: they capture both actual and future material 
welfare levels. The exact position and curvature of the production possibility curves depend 
on all the elements (production technology, abatement costs, climate change damages etc.) 
described in section 2.  
Point  A on the inner curve is given by the laissez-faire Nash equilibrium and entails an 
extremely unequal distribution of utility. The parallel welfare indifference lines (i.e. lines of 
equal social welfare) denoted by W
0, W
1 and W
2 represent a social welfare or bargaining 
power function in the spirit of the previous section. The unrestricted social optimum would be 
in point B with a much more equal distribution of utility. In order to go from point A to 
point B two steps have to be taken: first, greenhouse policies have to be implemented to bring 
us from the inner to the outer curve; second, an international income redistribution has to take 
place (and, in fact, the rich will have to give up part of their high living standard).  
It is also easy to show in this figure the consequences of the absence of an international 
government. If we are in point A and if the North is driven by self-interest it will never accept 
a policy which would bring its living standard below the one enjoyed in point  A. An 
analogous reasoning holds for the South and therefore, the absence of a world government 
(hence the fact that we have to rely on voluntary international agreements) limits us to   17
agreements that improve for both North and South on point A. These points are found to the 
right and above point A, in the shaded area in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Participation constraints and social optimal allocations 
 
Figure 1 is a strong simplification of the complex reality but it allows us to illustrate clearly 
some basic points. First, in a situation without world government and where nations are 
driven by self-interest, the best we can hope for are Pareto improving agreements bringing us 
somewhere on the segment CD. It is important to realise, however, that this restriction has 
nothing to do with justice but only follows from the power and the pursuit of self-interest by a 
large part of the world. It is better therefore to speak about participation constraints that put 
restrictions on the achievable outcomes. 
Secondly, the “best” (from a social point of view) while at the same time feasible agreement 
is easily defined: it is found in point C. Given the extremely unequal starting positions the 
gains from cooperation should go completely to the presently poor South. Note that this does 
not imply that the North has to give up part of its living standard. It enjoys the same utility 
level in the status quo-position A and in the socially optimal and feasible situation C. 
Third, a number of very specific proposals have been made of so-called “just solutions” to the 
burden sharing problem in the context of greenhouse negotiations. Examples of such 
proposals are: equal percentage reduction targets, equal per capita emission reductions, equal 
per capita cost shares etcetera. These proposals assume that the burden sharing problem is a 
“positive sum-game”, in which all participants would gain if an agreement could be reached.   18
The problem then becomes one of dividing the gains from cooperation or one of finding the 
“just” point on the line segment CD in Figure 1. Seen from this perspective, our suggestion to 
pick point C in Figure 1 might seem a very extreme one, in which all the gains go to the 
poorest partner or, alternatively, all efforts are borne by the richest partner. But the 
perspective is misleading, because it tends to neglect the grossly unjust starting positions of 
the different partners in the negotiations. One cannot reasonably talk about a “just” 
distribution of efforts or gains from greenhouse negotiations, if one does not place these 
negotiations within the broader context of the unequal international income distribution. 
Partial justice is a mirage if the broader context is extremely unjust!  
•  For every country, it is beneficial if other countries undertake more abatement effort. This 
observation gives rise to the so-called free riding behaviour: it is in every countries self 
interest to enjoy the benefits of reduced climate change without contributing to the 
required abatement effort. 
•  Because of the global public bad character of many transboundary pollution problems, 
countries often can make credible threats to abstain from environmental protection. Every 
candidate environmental agreement must therefore take into account participation 
constraints making the agreement voluntarily acceptable to all its signatories. 
•  Participation constraints put limits on the choice of socially optimal levels of emission 
reduction and burden sharing agreements. The higher the aspiration level, i.e. the utility 
level it can ensure itself by playing a credible non-cooperative strategy, of a particular 
country, the higher its power in international environmental negotiations. 
•  A socially desirable or “just” burden sharing arrangement should take into account 
absolute differences in starting positions of the participating countries in order to avoid the 
mirage of partial justice. 
 
4.  CONFRONTING THEORY AND REALITY FOR THE CASE OF 
GLOBAL WARMING 
In this section we will confront the theoretical conclusions derived in the previous section 
with the on-going climate negotiations in the framework of the UNFCCC. In particular, we 
will make a tentative evaluation of the efficiency and equity content of the Kyoto Protocol.   19
4.1 Cost and benefit estimates for GHG emission control 
During the last decade, a lot of empirical studies have been published in the economic 
literature giving more insight into the precise pattern of winners and losers for the global 
warming problem. The literature is huge and we will not attempt to survey it in the context of 
this article. We refer the interested reader to the bibliography at the end of this article. Instead, 
we will distinguish between two broad classes of empirical approaches that have been used in 
the context of climate change and we will summarize the main findings.  
Medium term climate policy evaluation models 
First, there is a huge and growing body of literature on the precise implementation issues of 
the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and in 
particular the famous 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Many reports, books and research papers address 
the burden sharing and the flexible mechanisms that were agreed upon in the subsequent 
Conferences of the Parties (CoPs) of the UNFCCC. Also the ratification difficulties, in 
particular the recent US withdrawal from the agreement, and the provisions for carbon sinks, 
are given ample attention in the literature. Mostly, the analyses use some medium term 
(typically a time horizon up to 2030) global partial or general equilibrium model to assess the 
impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on energy consumption and production and to draw a picture of 
the winners and losers of climate politics. The main conclusions of this type of models can be 
summarized as follows: 
•  For all Annex B countries (i.e. the countries that accepted quantified emission ceilings in 
the Kyoto Protocol), total gross costs to achieve the Kyoto targets (without emission 
trading) are relatively modest, in most cases even below 1% of GDP in 2010.  
•  Significant cost savings can be achieved by using flexible mechanisms like emission 
trading. The size of the cost savings increases as the size of the emission trading market is 
expanding. Unrestricted global trading of carbon entitlements would cut compliance costs 
by half or more. 
•  Most studies predict that there will be only a handful of permit exporters among Annex B 
countries, in particular the Russian Federation and Ukraine. This gives rise to serious 
concerns about strategic monopoly behaviour by these countries.  
•  Recent developments like the US withdrawal and the provisions for carbon sinks will 
cause the emission reduction target to be completely eroded.   20
Integrated assessment climate-economy models 
Integrated assessment models are models that combine a description of the economy with a 
stylised representation of the physical environment (the global carbon cycle and climate 
system in the case of global warming) in order to achieve an explicit feedback between the 
economic and climate variables. Definitely the most famous (and probably one of the earliest) 
example of integrated assessment models applied to global warming is the DICE (Dynamic 
Integrated Climate Economy) model by William D. Nordhaus. The typical time horizon used 
in integrated assessment models stretches out to several centuries because the coupled climate 
model is characterized by a high degree of inertia and long time lags before physical 
consequences of today’s emissions become visible. In order to study the regional differences 
and stability of international environmental agreements on climate change, integrated 
assessment models had to be regionalized. The single most influential model in this category 
is the RICE (Regional Integrated Climate Economy) model by Nordhaus and Yang. The 
model we used in section  2 of this paper is a simplified version of the RICE model. In 
particular we have ignored international trade issues in order to focus more deeply on the 
equity-efficiency trade off in climate change. The main results from these integrated 
assessment models can be summarized as follows: 
•  Due to extreme long time lags and inertia of the global carbon cycle and climate system it 
takes several decades (up to a century even) before the effect of current GHG emission 
reductions on global climate change becomes noticeable. In order to have a non-negligible 
impact on future temperature change, drastic and sustained GHG emissions cuts are 
necessary. 
•  The stakes in controlling GHG emissions are small compared to overall economic activity. 
In the absence of strong non-linear climate effects (e.g. a fast meltdown of a major part of 
the Antarctic ice sheet or a sudden change in the Atlantic conveyer belt), gross GDP losses 
for the world as a whole range between 1 and 2% for the 21
st century.  
•  Most developing countries tend to win relatively more than high-income countries when 
moving from a non-cooperative laissez-faire scenario to a coordinated global welfare 
maximizing climate policy. This is mainly due to their assumed high vulnerability to 
climate change damages. 
4.2 Main elements of the Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol is the result of a political agreement achieved during the Third 
Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC held in Kyoto in December 1997. The protocol was   21
signed by 84 countries and will come into force after official ratification by at least 55 
countries whose joint emissions represent at least 55% of the total emissions by the protocol 
members that have accepted quantified emission ceilings. By now (July  12, 2002) 75 
countries have ratified the text representing some 36% of the emissions. Hence, the first 
prerequisite has been met but a few major emitters still have to submit the text to their 
national parliament for official approval before the Protocol can come into force. 
The main objective of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol is to achieve a reduction of about 5% of GHG 
emissions by the industrialized signatories. Only 39 countries have accepted quantified 
emission reduction objectives, they are listed in an annex to the protocol and are therefore 
often referred to as the Annex B countries. The reduction obligations for the most important 
countries are as follows: European Union: -8%, USA: -7%, Japan and Canada: -6%, New 
Zealand, Russian Federation and Ukraine: 0%, Norway: +1%, Australia: +8%. The reduction 
obligations bear on 6 GHGs: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphurhexafluoride (SF6). 
An important element of the Kyoto Protocol is the provision for so-called flexibility 
instruments that enable countries to exchange emission reduction obligations. The main 
instruments are international emission trading, bubbles, joint implementation and clean 
development mechanism. We will shortly describe the instruments, more detailed information 
is available on the web page of the UNFCCC (see glossary). 
•  International emission trading (Article 17): Annex B countries can engage in international 
exchange of emission rights in order to meet their national targets. Countries emitting less 
than their ceiling can sell the surplus to countries that have difficulties meeting their 
target. The protocol is vague on the precise modalities of the emission trading instruments, 
the details were left to be filled out during subsequent CoPs. 
•  Bubbles (Article 4): under certain conditions, a group of countries can agree to reallocate 
their emission ceilings among each other while respecting their overall target. This 
instrument was used by the European Union to redistribute the overall EU target of –8% 
over the different EU member states. The internal burden sharing agreement within the EU 
has resulted in highly differentiated abatement requirements ranging from –21% for 
Germany and Denmark to +25% for Greece and +27% for Portugal (percentage changes 
with respect to 1990 emission levels).   22
•  Joint implementation (Article  6): is an instrument enabling the exchange of emission 
targets between two Annex  B countries on the basis of a verifiable project. This 
instrument makes it possible for, say the EU, to buy emission reduction in the Russian 
Federation. The instrument requires that the emission reduction is verifiable in the sense 
that it should result from a concrete project like the modernization of an existing power 
plant. 
•  Clean Development Mechanism (Article  12): is also a project based instrument for 
bilateral exchange of emission reductions. But in contrast to JI, CDM can be used to buy 
emission reduction from non-Annex B signatories of the Kyoto Protocol. This instrument 
would for instance allow Japan to buy emission reduction in China if Japan were to 
finance the construction of a combined heat and power plant on Chinese territory. 
4.3 Evaluation of the Kyoto Protocol 
We now turn to an evaluation of the Kyoto Protocol from an economic point of view.  
Figure 2: Marginal abatement cost functions and Kyoto objectives 
 
Figure taken from Eyckmans, van Steenberghe and Van Regemorter (2001). Is Kyoto fatally 
flawed? An analysis with McGEM.  
AUZ: Australia and New Zealand, 
CAN: Canada, 
CEU: Central and Eastern Europe (including former Soviet republics), 
EU15: European Union, 
JAP: Japan, 
OEU: Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, 
USA: United States of America.   23
Figure 2 shows marginal abatement cost functions for the main countries/regions that have 
adopted quantified emission reduction targets in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The horizontal axis 
depicts percentage emission reduction with respect to 1990 emissions, the vertical axis 
measures the cost in US$ per ton of CO2. The solid black dots in Figure 2 represent these 
Kyoto objectives for the different countries. The curves represent an estimate of the marginal 
carbon emission abatement cost functions for the different regions. They are drawn relative to 
1990 emissions and their intersection with the horizontal axis gives the estimate of emission 
growth between 1990 and 2010 in the business-as-usual scenario without explicit climate 
policy. For instance, emissions of the EU15 are projected to increase by approximately 24% 
with respect to 1990 emission levels. Central and Eastern European (CEU) emissions are 
projected to decrease by some 18% in BAU. 
We can use Figure 2 to make a tentative evaluation of the equity content of the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol. We will look successively at the overall Kyoto reduction target, the Kyoto burden 
sharing, the flexible mechanisms, the recent US withdrawal and finally, provisions for carbon 
sinks. 
Overall Kyoto emission reduction target 
All emission restrictions agreed upon in the Kyoto Protocol add up to approximately 5% 
emission reduction compared to 1990 emissions for the Annex B group of countries. It is 
however important to realize that the share of Annex B emission in the global total amounts to 
some two thirds (a share that is projected to decrease strongly to about 60% or even 50% by 
2010). Hence about one third of world emissions are not subject to emission ceilings and can 
grow unchecked. Moreover, these emissions come from major fast growing developing 
economies like China, India, Brazil and others. Therefore, the effect of the Kyoto Protocol on 
world emissions is only to slow down a little the staggering emission growth pace.  
In the Kyoto Protocol text there is no explicit reference to arguments that would justify this 
5% reduction in terms of expected future climate change damages. Only political 
compromising seems to have played in this case. For a more explicit long-term climate policy 
objective we can however refer to the general principle of the UNFCCC: 
The ultimate objective of this Convention […] is to achieve stabilization of greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved 
within a timeframe sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, 
to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to 
proceed in a sustainable manner. 
1992 UNFCCC, Article 2   24
This text gives some guiding principle that could be used to formulate a long term GHG 
global emission ceiling. There is no specific reference to an extended cost-benefit analysis but 
the general idea of a trade off between ecological sustainability and economic development is 
present.  
From the experience with integrated climate-economy models it should be clear however that 
the Kyoto reduction commitment is by far insufficient to attain the atmospheric concentration 
stabilization objective laid down in the 1992  UNFCCC. Far more drastic and sustained 
emissions cuts are required. Participation by the US and by major fast growing developing 
economies like China, India and Brazil in future commitment periods is therefore 
indispensable.  
Kyoto burden sharing agreement 
The 39 countries listed in the Annex B to the Protocol’s text all committed to a quantified 
emission limitation. Among those Annex B countries there is remarkably little differentiation 
of emission targets. Most Annex B countries have adopted reductions ranging between 0 and 
minus 8%, which is relatively little compared to projected emission growth between 1990 and 
2010. Therefore, without flexible mechanisms, differences of marginal costs are very large. 
Figure 2 reveals that they range from more than 170 $/ton CO2 for Scandinavian countries to 
about 50 $/ton CO2 for USA or even zero for the former Soviet Union. The latter countries do 
not have to make real efforts to cut back emissions since they have been assigned an emission 
ceiling exceeding even the highest emissions projections for 2010. It is therefore said that the 
former Soviet Union has been assigned “hot air”.  
How can we link these observations on marginal abatement costs in the actual Kyoto Protocol 
to the theoretical analysis of the previous section? We can clearly state that the cost efficiency 
has not been a primary objective in the original 1997  Kyoto Protocol burden sharing 
agreement. The targets have been differentiated little and some low cost countries have been 
completely exempted. One can interpret the relatively low marginal costs implied by the 
Kyoto burden sharing for the USA, Canada and Australia as a clear sign of their relatively 
strong bargaining power. In terms of expression  (14), these countries had relatively high 
power weights  i λ . On the other hand, one might argue that the exemption of quantified 
emission ceilings of most developing countries are of a more ethically inspired nature. These 
countries were apparently characterized by relatively high weights  i λ  as well but this has 
probably little to do with their strong bargaining position. It is more likely that the gentle   25
treatment of the developing countries is an expression of another basic general principle of the 
UNFCCC: 
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future 
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the 
developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the 
adverse effects thereof. 
UNFCCC, Article 3, first paragraph 
Flexible mechanisms 
Under pressure of the US delegation, the original Kyoto protocol text made very general 
provisions for so-called flexible mechanisms that would allow countries to exchange emission 
reductions with each other under different modalities. However the precise details of these 
mechanisms were left to subsequent CoPs and it has proven to be very difficult to get to a 
consensus on this issue. By now, the mechanisms have clearly been defined and institutions 
are being designed or set up to make them function.  
Theoretically, the flexible mechanisms should make it possible to achieve the overall 
emission reduction target at a far lower cost. Rational countries with relatively high abatement 
costs will choose to buy emission credits instead of reducing emissions domestically if the 
world market price of permits is lower than their domestic marginal abatement cost. Because 
of this fact, emission trading will lead to a convergence of marginal abatement costs and 
hence to a more cost efficient allocation of abatement efforts. The fact that allowing for 
exchanges of emission reduction credits will lead to substantial cost savings and more equal 
distribution of marginal costs is well established in both the theoretical an empirical 
environmental economics literature. 
In addition, these flexible mechanisms have important implications for the burden sharing 
agreement since they will generate substantial flows of financial resources from permit 
importers to permit exporters. Since most studies predict that there will be only one important 
permit exporter, in particular the former Soviet republics, there will be a substantial flow of 
money towards those countries. Also the developing countries can take advantage from the 
flexible mechanisms. Although they are not entitled to participate in emissions trading or JI, 
they can join in CDM projects with Annex B countries. This gives developing countries an 
opportunity to invest in more energy efficient power plants for instance and having an 
industrialized country pay for this investment. In general, the flexible mechanisms will 
generate transfers that will to a great extent flow from richer towards poorer signatories of the 
Protocol and will therefore improve upon the current unequal world income distribution.   26
US withdrawal 
Another important development in the post-Kyoto negotiations was the refusal in March 2001 
of President Bush to submit the Protocol for approval by the US Senate. From a descriptive 
point of view, we can argue that apparently, the participation constraint for the US was not 
satisfied in the original Kyoto Protocol (even including the flexible mechanisms). For 
subsequent commitment periods, it is crucial to get the US on board again but it is clear that 
the American bargaining position is much stronger than before. Any burden sharing proposal 
for the second commitment period (2013-2017) will have to take into account the US 
participation constraint as a prerequisite to achieve a larger coalition of countries engaging in 
GHG emission reductions. 
Carbon Sinks 
A final remark concerns the use of carbon sinks. Both activities resorting under Article 3.3 
(afforestation and deforestation) and Article 3.4 (revegetation, forest management, cropland 
management, grazing land management) can give rise to net additions to the assigned amount 
of an Annex B country. There are in principle no limits on Article 3.3 activities, except for the 
general principles of eligibility, reporting etc. For Article  3.4 activities however, and in 
particular for forest management, data are largely lacking and negotiators were afraid that the 
sinks credits would erode the general emission targets of the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, the 
amount of credits that can be obtained from forest management activities under Article 3.4 
has been limited to the total of all credits obtained under Article  3.3 activities. Further 
activities of forest management eligible under Article 3.4 should be such that total forest 
management activities of each party do not exceed the levels listed in the so-called Annex Z 
of the CoP  6bis (Bonn) agreement. In general the carbon sinks will make it easier for 
countries to meet their emission targets. Moreover, countries with relatively strong bargaining 
positions like for instance Canada, Japan and Australia have managed to get the most 
generous carbon sinks credits. 
 
5 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK TO THE FUTURE 
Starting point for this article is the observation that arguments concerning equity and the 
international distribution of income are likely to play an important role in multilateral 
negotiations on environmental agreements. In the first part of the paper we have used a 
maximization framework to illustrate the differences between the non-cooperative or laissez-
faire outcome and socially desirable solutions for transboundary pollution problems. This   27
maximization framework allows for ethical or bargaining power interpretations and can be 
used to solve the inverse optimum solution, i.e. compute the social weights implied by a given 
carbon emission abatement agreement. We have shown that if one care about world income 
distribution, the traditional cost-efficient burden sharing need not be socially optimal. The 
Samuelson rule for the optimal provision of greenhouse gas abatement is replaced by the 
condition that weighted marginal abatement costs should be equalised across all countries. We 
illustrated how participation constraints have an important impact on the set of achievable 
socially optimal outcomes. 
In a second part we have interpreted the 1992 UNFCCC and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol in the 
light of the theoretical model. We are able to explain many of the features of the actual burden 
sharing agreement in terms of power or ethically inspired arguments.  
As a general conclusion and outlook to the future we would like to argue the following. First, 
it is a mistake to talk about equity in the distribution of emission reduction targets in an 
international environmental agreement if one neglects the unequal world income distribution 
in the background. We should warn against a “mirage of partial justice” that seeks to find 
equitable solutions by isolating the burden sharing problem from the underlying unequal 
starting positions. The evidence in the framework of climate change negotiations seems to 
confirm this point. Developing countries and economies in transition were apparently given 
some respite for the time being.  
Secondly, participation constraints matter a lot and are to be included as constraints in the 
burden sharing negotiations. Again, the reality of climate negotiations seems to confirm this. 
Countries with strong bargaining power managed to negotiate relatively low emission 
reduction obligations whereas other, that felt that they could do better by not respecting the 
Protocol, simply left the room. Therefore, for the negotiations on the burden sharing in 
subsequent commitment periods of the Kyoto Protocol the prime objective should be to 
ensure that participation constraints of the major emitters are satisfied first, equity 
considerations should come into play second. 
Finally, it is important to stress that the 1997 Kyoto Protocol is only a first step on the way 
towards an effective long-term climate policy. The protocol only covers a first commitment 
period ranging from 2008 towards 2012. After the difficult Conferences of the Parties in The 
Hague, Bonn and Marrakech, and after the US withdrawal, no single expert will deny that the 
emission reduction content of the Protocol has been eroded completely. It is more important 
to recognize however that the general framework set out by the 1992 UNFCCC has survived.   28
The UNFCCC has laid the rails for a long-term climate policy whereas the Kyoto protocol is 
only a first train testing the tracks. Subsequent trains are to be put on the rails and the real 
emission reduction, including participation by developing countries, is the real challenge in 
the decades of climate negotiations to come. 
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